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I. INTRODUCTION

Since 1998, American companies have filed more than 150 lawsuits
against anonymous cyberposters' who have posted defamatory comments
on the World Wide Web.2 One of the reasons for the recent emergence of
defamation lawsuits against individuals is that the Internet makes it
* J.D./M.A. (Mass Communication), expected December 2002. I would like to thank
Professor Bill F. Chamberlin, Ph.D., for his helpful comments on an earlier draft. I dedicate this
note to my beautiful fiancd, Caryn, for all of the support and encouragement she has given to me.
1. A cyberposter can be defined as any person who creates a writing with the intention of
having the writing accessible on the World Wide Web. An anonymous cyberposter is initially
named as a John Doe defendant until the plaintiff discovers the defendant's identity, which is
usually accomplished by subpoenaing an Internet Service Provider's ("ISP") records. Lyrissa
BarnettLidsky, SilencingJohn Doe:DefamationandDiscoursein Cyberspace,49 DUKEL.J. 855,
858 n.6 (2000).
2. John A. Walker, Cybersmears, 6 CYBERsPAcE LAWYER 10 (2001), available at
http://www.jordenusa.com/CybersmearsSpr01.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2002).
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relatively easy for an individual to "publish."3 Another reason could be that
Internet anonymity frees individuals from restrictive social norms, including
a fear of accountability for speech.4 The average person, however, has not
considered the implications of publishing defamatory information in a
medium that is potentially accessible by millions of people.'
Suits alleging Internet defamation arise most often when a John Doe
posts derogatory information regarding a company on an Internet bulletin
board, causing the company's stock price to fall.6 Not only have these
postings contributed to declining stock prices, but derogatory postings also
have led to management resignations7 and rampant rumors regarding a
company's financial stability' and business practices. 9 In addition,
companies have sued John Does who have initiated mass emails that
criticize the companies' business practices."
Sometimes suing John Doe defendants can be poor strategy. For
example, when Ford Motor Company sued Robert Lane, the publisher of
www.blueovalnews.com, Ford experienced a consumer backlash." Ford
claimed that Lane's site, which was self-billed as the "independent voice of
the Ford community," disclosed confidential company information. 2 Not
only did Ford seek damages, but it also sought to shut the site down. 3
After the suit was filed, people became concerned that Ford could not "take
a little criticism."' 4 Ford is not alone in experiencing a backlash. After
engineering firm Stone & Webster sued John Doe for defarfiation, an
individual posted this criticism on a bulletin board: "S&W, stop wasting

3. Lilian Edwards, Defamation and the Internet, in LAW AND THE INTERNET 183, 188
(Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 1997). The development of the Internet has largely torn
down traditional barriers to publish, such as the need for large amounts of start-up capital.
4. Lee Tien, Innovation and the Information Environment: Who's Afraid ofAnonymous
Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REv. 117, 152 (1996).
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., Global Telemedia Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1264 (C.D. Cal.
2001); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 770 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
7. See, e.g., Tom Collins, FightingCyber-Slander,MIAMIDAILYBUS.REV., June 29, 2001.
8. See, e.g., Robert McGravey, Cyberslander, ELECTRONIC Bus., March 2001, at 39
(discussing a rumor that Skecher USA, Inc. planned to file for Chapter I I protection).
9. See, e.g., Action Is Often the Best Course When DealingwithInternetLibel, HOTEL AND
MOTEL MGMT., Feb. 7, 2000, at 26 (discussing a rumor that clothing designer Tommy Hilfiger
made racist statements on the Oprah Winfrey show).
10. See, e.g., Cordelia Brabbs, Red Bull Fights Off E-mail Saboteurs,MARKETING, March
30,2000, at I (detailing the efforts of Red Bull GmbH in defending its energy drink after an email
began circulating linking its product to brain tumors).
11. Anne Colden, Sending a Message: Companies Go to Court to Stop "Cyber-smearers,"
DENv. POST, Jan. 15, 2001, at E-01.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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shareholder money. Concentrate on doing your job and improving your
performance. That's the way to stop honest criticism.""5
The emerging backlash against corporate plaintiffs that sue John Doe
defendants has developed out ofthe notion that individuals should have the
right to speak anonymously. 6 The United States Supreme Court has held
that individuals have First Amendment protection to distribute anonymous
handbills and campaign literature. 7 Extending the Court's holdings to the
Internet is the natural next step because the Internet is simply an
inexpensive distribution mechanism for the 21 st Century "pamphleteer." 8
Moreover, the Court has granted the Internet broad First Amendment
protection. 9 Thus, these lawsuits inherently implicate the First
Amendment.2" However, not all John Does are allowing corporations to
steamroll their anonymity rights. Some John Does have countersued
corporations to prevent a corporation from discovering their identities.2'
Others have set up a website to support the right of anonymity on the
Web.22 Still other John Does have sought help from their ISPs, which have
challenged subpoenas on the John Does' behalf.23 In addition, the American
Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Privacy Information Center are
offering support to John Does.24

15. William J. Angelo, CompaniesSuing over Cybersmear,ENR, May 10, 1999, at 10.
16. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,357 (1995) (striking down an Ohio
statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature as unconstitutional); Talley
v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (striking down a Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting the
distribution of anonymous handbills as unconstitutional); Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com,
185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (finding a "legitimate and valuable right to participate in
online forums anonymously or pseudonymously .... This ability to speak one's mind without the
burden of the other party knowing all the facts about one's identity can foster open communication
and robust debate.").
17. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357; Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-65.
18. Tien, supra note 4, at 136-37; see also Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578.
19. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869-70 (1997).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating in part that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press").
21. See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1097-98 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (granting defendant's motion to quash subpoena); Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d
773, 778 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (affirming trial court's decision allowing discovery of
defendant's name); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 771-72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001) (affirming the trial court's decision denying discovery of defendant's name).
22. See John Does Anonymous Foundation, at http://www.johndoes.org (last visited Feb.
3, 2002). The site includes updates to recent John Doe lawsuits, allows users to register for
anonymous email accounts, and provides chat rooms for individuals to discuss civil liberty issues.
Id.
23. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000), rev'd, Am.
Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
24. 'JohnDoes'Fightto Keep Anonymity, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 6, 2000, at IM.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

The growing public sentiment against corporations suing John Does
may be for good reason. Legal action in Internet defamation cases,
especially actions with individuals as defendants, have a peculiar
motivation. Most actions are initiated by large, deep-pocketed corporations
against individuals without sufficient resources to satisfy a substantial
judgment.2" Thus, the usual cost-benefit analysis undertaken by a plaintiff
before initiating litigation does not apply.26 In situations where the John
Doe's criticism has merit, a corporation that sues for Internet defamation
is simply using the lawsuit as a scare or intimidation tactic to prevent
individuals from speaking out.27 These types of lawsuits have been termed
SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) suits by George
W. Pring and Penelope Canan.2" Corporations, in an effort to avoid a
consumer backlash, have developed a new litigation strategy: sue
anonymously. Corporations are attempting to navigate the unclear
standards that courts have developed over the past thirty years that allow
a plaintiff to proceed anonymously.29 For example, in March 2001, the
Virginia Supreme Court was the first appellate court in the United States
to tackle a case involving an anonymous corporation suing a John Doe

25. Lidsky, supra note 1, at 861.
26. See id. at 872, 876-83. This statement holds true to the extent that the benefit derived
is measured by the size of the judgment. See id. Other benefits such as protecting a corporate
image may justify a lawsuit. See id.
27. See GEORGEW. PRING &PENELOPECANAN, SLAPPS: GETING SUEDFOR SPEAKING OUT
8 (1996). See also http://www.epic.org/anonymity/aquacool-complaint.pdf (last visited Feb. 3,
2002) for a complaint filed against Yahoo!, which alleges:
On information and belief, Yahoo! knows or has reason to know that many ofthe
lawsuits seeking members' personal information are frivolous and would not
withstand a motion to dismiss. Yahoo! is aware that executives at publicly owned
companies that are featured on the message boards frequently take umbrage at
the critical comments posted about "their" companies on the message boards.
With sensitive egos and money to bum, such- companies often file a lawsuit
merely in order to obtain the right to subpoena Yahoo! for members' information
so that the company's curiosity and desire to silence the member can be satiated.
This phenomenon has been chronicled in numerous media. Nonetheless, the
subject of the lawsuit is unable to mount such a defense prior to Yahoo!'s
disclosure of personal information solely because the defendant is not notified by
Yahoo! of the lawsuit or the subpoena.
Id.
28. PRING & CANAN, supranote 27, at 8-9.
29. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Va.
2001). See also Tom Kertscher, Cyberspace Litigation Pits 'Anonymous' vs. 'Unknown,'
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 16, 2001, at 3B (discussing an individual filing a defamation suit
anonymously in Wisconsin). The author attempted to contact the plaintiff's attorney for an update
of the pending litigation, but received no reply.
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defendant for defamation in America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly
TradedCo.3" Although the Virginia Supreme Court refused to recognize an
Indiana trial court decision authorizing the anonymous plaintiff to obtain
the defendant's identity from a Virginia-based ISP,3 ' such cases will likely
become more common. It is already a common occurrence for courts to
receive subpoena requests from named corporate plaintiffs that seek to
uncover a cyberposter's identity." While it would be unusual for a
corporation to pursue an anonymous defamation claim against a John Doe
successfully, there is limited support for such an action.33 However, because
this is an emerging area of the law, courts have not yet developed a
systematic approach for dealing with this issue.
This Note explores the beginning of a new phenomenon: the ability of
an anonymous corporate plaintiff to sue a cyberposter. Part II of this Note
addresses the public's First Amendment right of access to courts and
whether anonymity unconstitutionally restricts access. Part III focuses on
the United States Supreme Court's recognition of a right to privacy and to
what extent that right applies to corporate litigants. Part IV discusses the
issue of SLAPP suits and how the motivation of Internet defamation suits
complicates the courts' need to balance a plaintiff's right to privacy and the
public's right of access. Finally, Part V suggests a framework for courts to
follow in attempting to balance a plaintiff s limited right to privacy with the
public's First Amendment right of access.
II. PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURTROOMS: HOW FAR DOES
THIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT Go?
The United States Constitution provides no explicit right for public
access34 to courtrooms.3 There has been, however, a strong common law

30. 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
31. Id. at382.
32. The nature of Internet defamation suits is unusual in that most suits are dropped after
the plaintiff discovers the defendant's identity. A compilation of filed complaints can be found at
http:llwww.cybersecuritieslaw.com/lawsuits/cases.corporatecybersmears.htm (last visited Feb.

3,2002).
33. See infraPart V.
34. The author uses the word "public" to refer to the general public as well as members of
the press, Nearly every courtroom has physical space limitations and therefore the entire public
cannot attend every trial. The press acts as the public's representative. Thus, although the press
does not have greater First Amendment protection than the public, members of the press are the
most frequent challengers of restrictions on courtroom access. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586 n.2 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
833-34 (1974) (holding that the First Amendment does not provide a greater right of access to the
press than the public); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-86, 690 (1972) (holding that a
reporter has no special protection against grand jury subpoenas); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713,728-30 (171) (Stewart, J., concurring) (finding that the First Amendment does not

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAWRE VIEW

[Vol. 54

tradition of open courtrooms dating back to 15th Century England.36 Since
the United States Constitution does not expressly grant or deny the right of
access to courtrooms, a question arose as to whether the drafters intended
to require all judicial proceedings to be open to the public." Through a
series of United States Supreme Court decisions between 1979 and 1986,
the question has largely been resolved in favor of a right of access.38
39 the Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld
In GannettCo. v. DePasquale,
the
constitutionality of restricting public access to pretrial judicial
proceedings. 4 At a pretrial hearing, in which two murder defendants moved
to suppress evidence and statements they had made to the police, the
defendants requested that the public be excluded from the hearing. 41 The
trial judge, in an attempt to balance the defendants' Sixth Amendment42
right to a fair trial with the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press,
granted the defendants' request to exclude the public from the courtroom.43
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the issue was whether the
public had a constitutional right to require pretrial judicial proceedings to
be open to the public.44

provide the press special access to information not available to the public).
35. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
36. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-569 (plurality opinion); Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979).
37. Gannett,443 U.S. at 370-71.
38. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1986) (Press-EnterpriseII);
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984) (Press-Enterprise1); Globe
Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 602; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81 (plurality opinion);
Gannett, 443 U.S. at 370.
39. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
40. Id. at 394.
41. Id. at 374-75. The defendants, who were the victim's fishing companions on the day of
the murder, gave statements to authorities that led police to the murder weapon. Id. at 370, 375.
Huge publicity surrounded the investigation, which included a manhunt for the defendants that
spanned two states and the possibility that the trial would commence before the police had
recovered the victim's body from the bottom of Seneca Lake. Id. at 372-74.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating in part "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed .... ).
43. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 376. Although the trial judge granted the motion, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed. Id. at 376. The defendants pled guilty before the
Appellate Division made its decision. Id. at 377 n.4. Thus, the pretrial hearing had no bearing on
the defendants' convictions. See id. The New York Court of Appeals later affirmed the decision
of the Appellate Division. Id. at 376. Furthermore, both the New York Court of Appeals and the
U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the issue was not moot, as the issue was "capable of repetition,
yet evading review." Id. at 377.
44. Id. at 370.
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Gannett, a large newspaper chain, argued that a constitutional right of
access rested in both the First and Sixth Amendments.4 Refusing to review
the First Amendment question, the Court determined that although a
defendant has a right to a public trial, there is no reciprocal right preventing
the defendant from having a private trial.46 Despite agreement between the
majority and the dissent that open courts "may improve the quality of
testimony, [and] induce unknown witnesses to come forward with relevant
testimony," the majority determined that the strong societal interest to
ensure a fair trial was more important.47 In noting that the closure of a
pretrial proceeding is one of the most effective means a trial judge can use
to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial, the Court provided further
support for the proposition that a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
trump the First Amendment when the two constitutional principles
conflict.48 Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion, went so far as to
interpret the Court's holding as "the Sixth Amendment does not require a
criminal trial or hearing to be opened to the public if the participants to the
litigation agree for any reason.., that it should be closed."49
With the GannettCourt having limited its decision topretrialhearings
but having referred to closure of a trialthroughout its opinion, 0 significant
confusion resulted, which was alleviated when the Court reviewed another
access case, Richmond Newspapers,Inc. v. Virginia,"'the following term.
In Richmond Newspapers, the defendant faced a fourth murder trial
because his first conviction was reversed and his next two trials ended in
mistrials.52 To prevent a third mistrial, the defendant moved to close the
trial to the public.53 One day after granting the defendant's motion to close
the trial, the judge directed a verdict of not guilty. 4
In an extremely divided Court, with no opinion garnering support from
more than three Justices, the plurality distinguished Gannett by finding a
significant difference between the right to attend criminal trials and the right
to attend pretrial hearings." A majority of the Court found constitutional

45. Id. at 376.
46. Id. at 381 & n.9, 382.

47. Id. at 383, 392-93, 427-28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 378-79; see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-51 (1966).
49. Gannett,443 U.S. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

50. Id. at 379-83.
51. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
52. Id. at 559 (plurality opinion).
53. Id. at 561 (plurality opinion).
54. Id. at 561-62 (plurality opinion). Richmond Newspapers sought to vacate the order, but
after a closed hearing, the trial judge denied the request. Id. at 561 (plurality opinion). Richmond
Newspapers then unsuccessfully appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court. Id. at 562 (plurality
opinion).
55. Id. at 563-64 (plurality opinion).
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protections for open courtrooms in the First Amendment rather than the
Sixth Amendment. 6 The protections offered by the First Amendment,
including the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, the right to
peacefully assemble, and the right to petition the government for a redress
of grievances, all share a common purpose in that these rights aid the
public's duty of ensuring a properly functioning government.57
Furthermore, the Court determined that certain traditions such as open
courtrooms share the same common purpose underlying the First
Amendment principles and therefore should have the same protections."
Although the Court recognized that the public's right was not absolute, it
held that a trial court must have no other alternatives to adequately protect
the defendant's right to a fair trial before excluding the public from a trial.59
With the fractured Richmond Newspapers decision failing to provide
sufficient guidance for the Court's Gannett decision, the Court decided
Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court" two years later. In Globe, the
Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that mandated state courts to
exclude the public from the courtroom during the testimony ofminors who
are sex crime victims." While the Court recognized that the public's access
privilege was not absolute in Richmond Newspapers, the Court reiterated
that exclusions should be rare.6" Thus, any mandatory exclusion will most

56. Seven Justices out of eight participating in the decision held that the First Amendment
protects the public's right of access to courts. Id. at 576 (plurality opinion), 581-82 (White, J.,
concurring), 584 (Stevens, J., concurring), 585 (Brennan, J., concurring), 598 (Stewart, J.,
concurring), 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 575-76 (plurality opinion).
58. Id. at 575 (plurality opinion). Specifically, the Court relied on historical evidence
indicating that criminal trials were presumptively open at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.
Id. at 567 (plurality opinion), 589-93 (Brennan, J., concurring). In addition, the Court recognized
that public scrutiny ensures the proper functioning of the judicial system. Id. at 569 (plurality
opinion), 593-97 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. The Court suggested reasonable alternatives such as sequestering or excluding witnesses
from the courtroom or instituting time, place, and manner restrictions during the course of a trial.
Id. at 581 n. 18 (plurality opinion), 600 (Stewart, J., concurring). In addition, while the concurring
opinion of Justices Brennan and Marshall did not address the possibility of less intrusive
alternatives, both Justices had joined the Gannett dissenting opinion, which would have required
the defendant to prove that alternatives to closing the trial would be ineffective. Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 441 (1979) (Blackmun, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also Mark R. Stabile, Note & Comment, Free Press-FairTrial: Can They Be Reconciled in
a Highly PublicizedCriminalCase?,79 GEO. L.J. 337,343-47 (1990) (providing examples of how
alternatives have been used). See generally Gerald T. Wetherington, et al., Preparingforthe High
Profile Case: An Omnibus Treatment for Judges and Lawyers, 51 FLA. L. REv. 425 (1999)
(providing guidance to judges and lawyers in balancing the conflicting rights of the free press/fair
trial issue).
60. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
61. Id. at 598, 602.
62. Id. at 606-07. The Court relied on the same historical arguments as in Richmond
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likely be held unconstitutional given that a constitutional analysis would
require a trial judge to conduct a strict scrutiny review.63 Since a trial judge
must determine whether a compelling state interest exists and whether
excluding the public is narrowly tailored to. meet that interest, a
case-by-case approach must be relied upon rather than a general rule of
exclusion.64
In further expanding its holding in Globe, the Court has provided some
guidance for lower courts faced with a defendant's request to close a trial
to the public.6" In Press-Enterprise ,66 a unanimous Court applied strict
scrutiny review to reverse a decision by a California trial court judge to
close voir dire in a trial involving the rape and murder of a teenage girl.67
The Court noted thatjury selection has been a historically open process that
aids the proper functioning of the judiciary system and held that the trial
judge erred in failing to consider less intrusive alternatives than closing the
courtroom to the public.6"
Two years later, in Press-Enterprise11,69 the Court developed the
current constitutional standard for open access to courtrooms. 70 The Court,
in a 7-2 decision, drew from its prior access to courts jurisprudence and
developed a two-tiered analysis.7 First, the Court suggested that lower
courts should determine whether the proceeding has been traditionally open
to the public and whether the openness plays a "significant positive role" in
the judicial process.' Second, if the proceeding is determined to be
presumptively open, the defendant's request for closure must be subjected
to strict scrutiny review.7' In applying this two-tiered analysis, the Court
reversed a California trial judge's refusal to release a transcript of a closed
preliminary judicial proceeding.74 The Court's decision in Press-Enterprise

Newspapers. Id. at 605-06. See supranote 58.

63. Globe, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
64. Id. at 607-08.
65. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1986) (Press-Enterprise11);
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984) (Press-Enterprise1).
66. 464 U.S. 501, 503, 505 (1984).

67. Id. at 503, 505.
68. Id. at 505, 508, 511.
69. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
70. Id. at 8-10.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 8. In prior access to courtroom cases, the Court used historical evidence and the
usefulness of publicity as a check on the judicial system to support a strict scrutiny analysis. See
supra note 58. This decision effectively requires a court to base its decision upon whether a
particular proceeding has been historically open to the public and whether the publicity will
ensure a properly functioning judicial system.
73. Press-EnterpriseH1, 478 U.S. at 9.

74. Id. at 15.
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I, while not overturning Gannett, casts doubt as to Gannett's continuing
precedential value."
While criminal defendants have attempted to use the Sixth Amendment
to close courtrooms, corporations, through the use of protective orders
during discovery, attempt to keep details of alleged wrongdoing from the
public view." For example, concern over secrecy in product liability
litigation has caused the United States Senate Judiciary committee to
investigate." Product liability litigation is especially prone to secrecy
because the defendants want to limit exposure, the corporate plaintiffs want
to settle quickly, and the judge wants to clear an overflowing docket.7" As
a result of sealing court documents in product liability cases, the same
products that the manufacturer implicitly agrees are unsafe by agreeing to
settle with a plaintiff remain on the market, threatening an otherwise
unwary public.7 9 In testimony before the Senate Judiciary committee, First
Amendment expert, Paul K. McMasters, argued that while this "system may
work well for the parties directly involved... [t]he courts do not exist to
resolve private disputes behind closed doors."8 Thus, the real interested
party in opening up the judicial system is the public, not the litigants.
Supporters of protective orders argue that confidentiality leads to a
better outcome than permitting the public unfettered access to private
information. 8' Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require wide
disclosure of evidence, protective orders provide litigants some degree of
assurance that their adversaries will use private information only for trial
preparation." Without such protection, litigants may be more likely to
proceed to trial to defend their reputations and less likely to comply fully
with discovery requests.8 Both of these effects would lead to higher
litigation costs.

75. Another Supreme Court decision also casts doubt on Gannett's precedential authority.
See El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149 (1993) (striking down a rule of
criminal procedure of Puerto Rico that required preliminary hearings to be held in private unless
the defendant requested otherwise).
76. See generally Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of
Confidentialityin the Pursuitof Settlement, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 283 (1999).
77. Court Secrecy: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on CourtsandAdmin. Practiceofthe S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 10 1st Cong. (1990) [hereinafter Hearings].
78. Id. at 155 (statement of Paul K. McMasters).
79. Id. at 155-56 (statement of Paul K. McMasters). Sealed documents have allowed
dangerous playground equipment to remain on playgrounds without warning parents. Id. at 156
(statement of Paul K. McMasters). In addition, toxic spills that threatened entire neighborhoods
have remained a secret. Id. (statement of Paul K. McMasters).
80. Id. at 155 (statement of Paul K. McMasters).
81. Id. at 193 (statement of Professor Arthur R. Miller).
82. Id. at 202 (statement of Professor Arthur R. Miller).
83. Id. at 202-03 (statement of Professor Arthur R. Miller).
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Although there is a robust debate among scholars as to the
pervasiveness of confidentiality in the court and whether court secrecy
hampers the administration ofjustice, there is little empirical evidence to
support either side's argument.' Nevertheless, some of the same First
Amendment arguments the United States Supreme Court has used to
protect the public's access to criminal trials are applicable to protective
orders." Although proponents of protective orders correctly point out that
the United States Supreme Court has never found a First Amendment right
of access to civil trials, there is substantial support in the lower courts.8 6
Thus, at least theoretically, civil litigants should be subject to the
Press-Enterprise11 test, as civil trials have been historically open to the
public and publicity fulfills an important role in the judicial process.8 7
Court secrecy and closed courtrooms limit the public's First
Amendment right ofaccess to the judicial process. Similarly, a litigant's use
of a pseudonym limits the public's right of access by preventing the public
from fully understanding the motivation ofthe litigation. For example, in an
Internet defamation action, the public is prevented from casting judgment
on an anonymous corporate plaintiffwhen it brings a weak defamation case
against a critic. The use of pseudonyms, however, may help preserve the
privacy rights of litigants.
III. HAVE COURTS RECOGNIZED A PLAINTIFF'S
RIGHT TO PRIVACY?

A. History of the Right to Privacy

Unlike the right of access to courts, the right to privacy is not wellgrounded in the common law. It was not until the late 19th Century when
aggressivejournalism prompted Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis
to urge American courts to recognize a right to privacy or the "right to be
let alone."88 Warren and Brandeis complained of the increased discussions
of sex and gossip in the daily newspapers, and determined that a judicial
remedy was necessary.89 In arguing for a right of privacy, Warren and

84. Dore, supra note 76, at 301.
85. Id. at 322-23.
86. Hearings,supra note 77, at 194 (statement of Professor Arthur R. Miller). Both state
and federal courts have extended the Court's holdings to apply to civil proceedings. See, e.g.,
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1984); NBC Subsidiary (KNBCTV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 340 (Cal. 1999).
87. But see Dore, supra note 76, at 320-21.
88. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193,
195-96 (1890). Warren and Brandeis credit the phrase "right to be let alone" to Judge Cooley. Id.
at 195.
89. Id. at 196.
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Brandeis analogized the right to be let alone with similar preexisting rights
such as the right not to be defamed, the right not to be falsely imprisoned,
the right not to be assaulted, and the right not to be maliciously
prosecuted.9" In essence, Warren and Brandeis claimed that a right of
privacy existed in the common law by 1890.
While courts slowly adopted Warren and Brandeis's argument over the
next half-century, it was not until Dean Prosser helped sort out the privacy
jurisprudence that the privacy tort gained some sense of order. Prosser
synthesized the existing common law and explained that the privacy tort
was not a single tort, but a group of four distinct torts that shared a
common name.9 Prosser, as the reporter for the American Law Institute's
Restatement (Second) of Torts, later incorporated these torts into the
Restatement. 92
Beginning in the 20th Century, the United States Supreme Court began
expanding Warren and Brandeis's right to privacy into a constitutional
right. Although the enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights are few, certain
fundamental rights receive protection by an inherent zone of privacy.93 The
privacy right is formed by penumbras emanating from the guarantees ofthe
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.9 4 Courts have generally
protected two different kinds of privacy interests in litigation.9" The first
interest involves the right to make certain types ofpersonal decisions, such
as whether to use contraceptives,96 marry,9 7 live with extended family
members,98 and home-school children. 99 The second interest involves the
right to choose not to disclose personal information."' A litigant who
attempts to use a pseudonym is effectively asserting the latter privacy right.
Whether litigants have a privacy right is, however, an unsettled area of the
law.

90. Id. at 205.
91. William L. Prosser, Privacy,48 CAL. L. REV. 383,389 (1960). Specifically the four torts
were described as: "I. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs. 2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 3. Publicity which
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 4. Appropriation, for the defendant's
advantage, of the plaintiffs name or likeness." Id.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
93. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
94. Id.

95.
1068-69
96.
97.
(1967).
98.
99.
100.

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,599-600 (1977); Kneeland v. NCAA, 650 F. Supp. 1064,
(W.D. Tex. 1986).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-53 (1972); Griswold,381 U.S. at 485-86.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (plurality opinion).
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
Kneeland,650 F. Supp. at 1068.
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B. Litigants'ImplicitRight to Privacy
In both state and federal courts, the rules of civil procedure implicitly
prohibit anonymous parties from proceeding in court.' However, such
generalized rules do not take into account individual factual circumstances.
For example, some litigants must reveal extremely personal facts that lack
any significant public concern. Arbitrarily denying all litigants the right to
remain anonymous to avoid revealing private matters causes an unfair
intrusion into litigants' private lives.
In the past thirty years, courts have recognized a limited privacy right
for a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit. 2 Although the United States Supreme
Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of a plaintiff proceeding
anonymously, there has been -a marked increase in the number of
anonymous plaintiffs since Roe v. Wade °3 was permitted to proceed with
anonymous plaintiffs.0 4 The United States Supreme Court's silence has led
courts to decide the issue in an ad hoc fashion as recently as the early
1980s. °5 Beginning in the 1980s, however, courts began developing broad
standards to determine whether a plaintiff could proceed anonymously.
The Fifth Circuit has been especially active in developing standards to
apply to plaintiff requests for anonymity. In SouthernMethodist University
Association of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe," 6 the Fifth Circuit
denied anonymity to the plaintiffs after analyzing decisions in wvhich other
courts had allowed plaintiffs to proceed anonymously." 7 The court noted
that all plaintiffs who were successful in proceeding anonymously had three
similarities: (1) the plaintiffwas challenging a governmental activity; (2) the
plaintiff was required to disclose information of utmost intimacy; and (3)
the plaintiff was compelled to admit his intention to engage in illegal
conduct." 8 This three-part test has not only provided guidance for the Fifth
Circuit, but for other courts as well.'0 9

101. For example, Rule 10 states that "In the complaint the title of the action shall include
the names of all the parties .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 10. See also Rule 17, which states that "[e]very
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." FED. R. Civ. P. 17.
102. See Adam A. Milani, Doe v. Roe: An Argument for Defendant Anonymity when a
PseudonymousPlaintiffAllegesaStigmatizinglntentional
Tort,41 WAYNEL.REv. 1659, 1660-62
(1995).
103. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
104. Milani, supra note 102, at 1662. Federal decisions before 1969 with Doe plaintiffs or
known Doe defendants are rare. Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When
Should LitigantsBe Permittedto Keep Their Identities Confidential?,37 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1 n.2
(1985).
105. See Steinman, supra note 104, at 2.
106. 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979).
107. Id. at713.
108. Id.
109. E.g., Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11 th Cir. 1992) (citing S. Methodist Univ, 599
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In another Fifth Circuit case, Doe v. Stegall," ° the court weighed the
plaintiffs' privacy interests against the public's right of access to courts."'
In Stegall, the Fifth Circuit reviewed an interlocutory appeal as to whether
two Jewish middle school students could sue their school board
anonymously to challenge the constitutionality of allowing prayer in
Mississippi's public schools. 2 While the court recognizedthe requirements
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include the names of all parties
named in the action, 1 3 the court also noted that Rule 26(c) gave the court
broad discretion to protect a party from "annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense."' " The Fifth Circuit held that the
plaintiffs could proceed anonymously because the plaintiffs met all three of
the SouthernMethodistfactors. 5 Despite the mechanical application ofthe
Southern Methodist test, the Fifth Circuit was quick to point out that it
fast formula for ascertaining whether a party may
"advance[d] no hard' and
6
"
sue anonymously."
While courts throughout the country have adopted the reasoning of
SouthernMethodistand Stegall,plaintiffs who disclose "intensely personal"
facts appear to have the greatest likelihood of prevailing in a motion to
proceed anonymously. There may be nothing more personal than pregnancy
and -abortions, and judges have provided the greatest deference to
anonymous plaintiffs in such cases." 7 The strong privacy rights for a
plaintiff in an abortion lawsuit protect the plaintifffrom severe social stigma
F.2d at 712); Heather K. v. City of Mallard, 887 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Doe v.
Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 418, 421 (D. Mass. 1995).
110. 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).
111. Id.at 186.
112. Id. at 181.
113. SeeFED. R. CIv. P. 10.
114. Stegall, 653 F.2d at 184 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)).
115. Id. at 186. The Stegall court found that (1) the plaintiffs were suing to challenge a
governmental activity; (2) the suit required the disclosure of intimate information because
"religion is perhaps the quintessentially private matter"; and (3) that although the students were
not compelled to confess an intention to commit a crime, there was great potential to acquire
infamy similar to committing a crime by challenging the Christian beliefs in the small Mississippi
town. Id.
116. Id. at 186.
117. See, e.g., Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 519 (1977); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 184
(1973); Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 679 (1 1th Cir. 2001); Doe v.
Gen. Hosp., 434 F.2d 427, 429 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 652 (D.
Mont. 1974); Doe v. Dunbar, 320 F. Supp. 1297, 1298 (D. Colo. 1970). In several instances, the
privacy rights of the plaintiffs were so strong that there was no challenge to the plaintiffs
anonymity. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 n.4 (1973) (dismissing the issue with a
mere footnote that Jane Roe was a pseudonym); Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Engler, 73 F.3d
634, 635 (6th Cir. 1996) (presuming the ability of plaintiff to use a pseudonym without
discussion); Doe v. First Nat'l Bank, 865 F.2d 864, 865 (7th Cir. 1989) (presuming the ability of
plaintiff to use a pseudonym without discussion).
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that may result from asserting her constitutional rights. In that same light,
women who have been sexually assaulted" 8 or raped. 9 are similarly
protected. In addition, sexual molestation victims have a privacy right. 20
Courts have also found disability,' 2' AIDS,'1 and mental illness'2 deserving
of protection from public scrutiny.
While case law supporting anonymous plaintiffs is dominated by
plaintiffs seeking to shield intimate private details from public view, courts
may also use anonymity to protect plaintiffs from severe economic harm.
In an action premised on the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Ninth Circuit
permitted twenty-three foreign garment workers to sue twenty-one garment
manufacturers anonymously.124 The garment workers sued on behalf of the
25,000 garment workers who lived as nonresidents in the United States'
territory of the Northern Mariana Islands. 2 Plaintiffs feared that if not
permitted to sue anonymously, they would be fired from their jobs,
deported from the United States,
and arrested upon their return to the
26
China.
of
Republic
People's
In reversing the district court's order denying the plaintiffs' request to
proceed anonymously, the Ninth Circuit set forth a three-prong test to
guide the district court.2 7 In applying the test, the Ninth Circuit held that

118. See, e.g., Doe v. Evans, 202 F.R.D. 173, 175 (E.D. Pa. 2001). But see Doe v. N.C. Cent.
Univ., No. 1:98CV01095, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9804, at *12-*14 (M.D.N.C. April 15, 1999)
(holding that courts are reluctant to allow plaintiff anonymity even in sexual assault cases).
119. See, e.g., C.R.K. v. Martin, No. 96-1431-MLB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22305, at *6 (D.
Kan. July 10, 1998) (granting anonymity to minor female who had been raped); Doe v. St.
George's Sch., No. 88-0676B, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6779, at *2 (D.R.I. May 30, 1989) (granting
anonymity to a minor female who had been raped).
120. See, e.g., Wilson v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 144 F. Supp. 2d 690, 690 (E.D. Tex.
2001); Doe v. Covington County Sch. Bd., 884 F. Supp. 462, 465 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Doe v. X
Corp., No. CV93-0351397, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 273, at *1 n.1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 1997);
Doe v. Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d 1067, 1074 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994).
121. See, e.g., Heather K. v. City of Mallard, 887 F. Supp. 1249, 1251-52, 1256 (N.D. Iowa
1995). But see A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp., 660 A.2d 1199, 1200 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)
(refusing to grant anonymity in an employment discrimination claim where the plaintiff claimed
to suffer from exhibitionism).
122. Doe v. Hirsch, 731 F. Supp. 627, 628 & n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
123. Anonymous v. Legal Servs. Corp., 932 F. Supp. 49, 50 (D.P.R. 1996).
124. Doe v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000).
125. Id. at 1063. To secure employment, these workers were required to sign a contract with
a recruiting agency, which entitled the agency to receive several thousand dollars as payment upon
the employee's return home. Id.
126. Id. at 1062. In addition, the plaintiffs feared that China would accelerate the repayment
of debt owed to the recruiting agency. Id. at 1063. It was possible for economic retaliation to
extend to the garment workers' families as well. Id. at 1065.
127. Id. at 1068 ("[T]he district court should determine the need for anonymity by evaluating
the following factors: (1) the severity of the threatened harm; (2) the reasonableness of the
anonymous party's fears; and (3) the anonymous party's vulnerability to such retaliation.")
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the district court's finding that anonymity can never be used to protect
against economic injury was incorrect as a matter of law.2 8 In addition, the
Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' fears were reasonable and that they
were sufficiently vulnerable to retaliation.19 Most importantly, however,
the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants' arguments that allowing the
plaintiffs to proceed anonymously would violate the public's right of access
to courtrooms. 130 The court could protect the public's right by permitting
access to the facts and the decision, but withholding the plaintiffs' names.'31
As previously discussed in Part II, there is a strong presumption of open
courtrooms, and thus surviving a balancing test is an uphill battle for many
anonymous plaintiffs. 132 Even plaintiffs who sue to recover damages
involving extremely private matters such as sexual abuse are not always
granted the right to proceed anonymously.' 33 For example, the district court
in Doe v. Smith denied the plaintiff's request to proceed anonymously
despite the plaintiff's claims that she was molested and sexually assaulted
by her psychiatrist. 134 The district court acknowledged the need to balance
the plaintiffs privacy rights with the public's right of access to
courtrooms.' 35 The district court borrowed the SouthernMethodistfactors,
and added two additional factors: (1) "whether identification would put the
plaintiffat risk of physical or mental injury" and (2) "whether the defendant
would be prejudiced [if the plaintiff proceeded] anonymously.' 36
While the district court recognized the extremely private nature of the
charges, it also determined that the plaintiff's credibility was ultimately at
issue. 13 Since the plaintiff was not challenging a governmental action, but
alleging that the defendant committed extremely despicable behavior, the
court had to allow the defendant to publicly defend himself against an
uncloaked accuser. 13 The court was also concerned about setting a

(citations omitted).
128. Id. at 1070.
129. Id. at 1071. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the plaintiffs did not need to prove that
the defendants would carry out their threats, only that the plaintiffs reasonably believed that the
defendants would. Id.
130. Id. at 1069.
131. Id. at 1072-73.
132. See W.N.J. v. Yocom, 257 F.3d 1171, 1172 (10th Cir. 2001) ("proceeding under a
pseudonym in federal courts is... 'an unusual procedure.') (citation omitted); Doe v. Deschamps,
64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont. 1974) (holding that the general rule prohibits pseudonyms).
133. See, e.g., Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027,1048 (N.D. Iowa 1999); Doe v. Smith, 189
F.R.D. 239, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
134. Doe v. Smith, 189 F.R.D. at 241.
135. Id. at242.
136. Id. (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 242-43.
138. Id. at 243-44. By prohibiting the plaintiff from shielding her identity while casting
accusations against the defendant, the court attempted to place the alleged victim and the alleged
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"disturbing precedent," allowing patients to sue psychiatrists for sexual
improprieties anonymously.'39
Following the Doe v. Smith reasoning, courts ordinarily balance the
plaintiff's privacy with the public's right of access to courtrooms. For
example, privacy rights do not extend universally to all suits involving
abortion. 40 In addition, even if a court grants a petition to proceed
anonymously to one plaintiff, the privacy right does not necessarily extend
to all co-plaintiffs in the same suit. 4 ' A further indication of the courts'
struggle with balancing the plaintiffs privacy rights and the public's right
of access to courtrooms is that courts have been reluctant to extend the
privacy right to corporations.
C. Privacy Rights Applied to Corporations
Courts have summarily denied the right of privacy to corporations.'
Courts generally hold that since corporations are artificial entities and only
exist when recognized by state law, the state can deprive a corporation of
a privacy right.' Courts have had difficulty finding a corporate right of
privacy because courts have focused on whether a corporation can be
embarrassed to the same degree as individuals upon public disclosure of
private facts.' The private facts that an individual may seek to shield from
public view consist of intimate details of a private life, which is a stark

attacker on equal footing. Compare that rationale with the highly controversial rules of evidence
relating to a defendant's character in sexual assault cases. See FED. R. EVID. 413-15.
139. Smith, 189 F.R.D. at 244-45.
140. See, e.g., M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 804 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming the trial
court's determination that the public interest in open trials outweighed the privacy rights of an
indigent inmate seeking an abortion). See also Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253
F.3d 678, 689 (11 th Cir. 2001) (Hill, J. dissenting) ("I doubt ... that there is any longer a real
threat of 'social stigma' associated with [having an abortion]").
141. Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont. 1974) (limiting the privacy right to
the pregnant woman and refusing to extend the right to her doctor).
142. See DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY § 1.4, at 11-12 (1991).
143. See, e.g., Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65-66 (1974); United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950); Clinton Cmty. Hosp. Corp. v. S. Md. Med. Ctr.,
374 F. Supp. 450,456 (D. Md. 1974); Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp., 195 Cal. Rptr. 393,409-10 (Ct.
App. 1983); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 691 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Mass. 1998); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 cmt. c (1977) (stating that a corporation has no
cause of action for a right of privacy).
144. See, e.g., Med. Lab Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1493 (D. Ariz.
1996); Nabisco, Inc. v. Ellison, No. 94-1722, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160,41, at * 14-* 16 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 8, 1994); Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson, 168 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (Ct. App. 1980); Felsher v.
Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 594-95 (Ind. 2001). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 6521 cmt. c (1977).
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information that a corporation may seek to shield
contrast from confidential
45
from competitors.

Although corporations may not have the same type of intimate secrets
as individuals, corporations have certain confidential information, and
therefore seek some recognition of a right of privacy. Consequently, while
courts have been reluctant to find an express right of privacy covering all
of a corporation's activities, courts have found limited privacy rights for
business entities in certain situations.' 46 Courts have generally used the right

of privacy to protect corporations from 1) harassment; 2) disclosure of
financial information; 3) unfair business practices; and 4) misuse of the
discovery process.
Courts have held that businesses have a right to be free from harassment48
by the government. 147 In Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General,

the Socialist Workers Party sued the United States for common law
invasion of privacy. 49 The political party charged that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation had engaged in a campaign of excessive interrogations,
spied on party members with surveillance equipment, and committed
burglaries to harass the party's membership. 5 ° The court discounted the
government's reliance on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 6521, which
states that a privacy right is a personal right.' Instead, the court noted that
the Restatement is not "intended to exclude the possibility of further

145. See Felsher, 755 N.E.2d at 594-95.
146. See, e.g., Bowsherv. Merck& Co., 460 U.S. 824,836 (1983) (denying the government's
request to review corporate records to ascertain the company's manufacturing costs); Tavoulareas
v. Wash. Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding privacy rights in corporation's
confidential information), vacatedon othergroundsby 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc);
E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970) (protecting
corporation's privacy from industrial espionage); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 463
F. Supp. 515, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding a right of privacy for associations); Ameri-Medical
Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 383 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding a
limited privacy right in financial records for a corporation); H & M Assocs. v. City of El Centro,
167 Cal. Rptr. 392, 399-400 (Ct. App. 1980) (finding a right of privacy for partnerships); Camp,
Dresser & McKee, Inc. v. Steimle & Assocs., 652 So. 2d 44, 50 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (finding
violation of privacy through an unfair trade practice statute for a corporation); see also Kneeland
v. NCAA, 650 F. Supp. 1064, 1069 (W.D. Tex. 1986) (acknowledging a corporation's limited
privacy right, but not finding a violation of the right with the specific facts); Roberts, 195 Cal.
Rptr. at 411 (acknowledging a corporation's limited privacy right, but not finding a violation of
the right with the specific facts).
147. Socialist Workers, 463 F. Supp. at 525; H & MAssocs., 167 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
148. 463 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
149. Id. at 516-17.
150. Id. at 518. In addition, the government contacted party members' friends, landlords,
prospective employers, and families to provoke hostility and discrimination against the political
party. Id.
151. Id. at 524-25; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 cmt. c (1977).
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developments in the tort law ofprivacy."' 52 In recognizing a right ofprivacy
for an association, the court relied on the premise that the association's
right was 53intertwined with its members, and could not be easily
separated.1
However, not all extensions of the privacy right to business entities
require an intertwinement between the entity and its principals. California
extended the right of privacy when a local government harassed a limited
partnership.s 4 The partnership was in the process of refinancing the
mortgages of its financially troubled apartment complex and was delinquent
in paying its water service bills. 5 Although the partnership remitted the
delinquent amount after it received a delinquency notice, the local
government shut offwater service and notified the mortgagees and the local
newspaper.' 56 In finding a right of privacy, the court discounted the
formalistic differences between partnerships, corporations, and
individuals.' 57 In addition, the court noted that just as an individual can
build his reputation, a business can increase its goodwill. 58
A second important protection for corporations is a limited protection
of financial information.' While corporations do not receive broad
protection against disclosing financial information in a governmental
investigation,' 60 courts do provide limited protection. 61 For example, in
Bowsher v. UnitedStates,162 the United States Supreme Court refused to
enforce a General Accounting Office demand to inspect Merck & Co.'s
financial records. 63 By restricting government access to records relating to

152. Socialist Workers, 463 F. Supp. at 525.
153. Id.
154. See H & M Assocs. v. City of El Centro, 167 Cal. Rptr. 392, 395 (Ct. App. 1980).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 396. The local government hoped to purchase the land at a foreclosure sale for
governmental use. Id
157. Id. at 399. The court noted that an individual can incorporate his sole proprietorship and
large businesses can be run as partnerships. Id. Thus, the court seemed to be troubled to take a
formalistic view as to whether a privacy action is precluded merely based on the fact that the
plaintiffwas a corporation.
158. Id.
159. See Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 836 (1983); Ameri-Medical Corp. v.
Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 383 (Ct. App. 1996).
160. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-19 (1984) (holding that

a corporation's independent auditors do not have a work product privilege in protecting a client's
financial records).
161. Bowsher, 460 U.S. at 836.
162. 460 U.S. 824 (1983).
163. Id. at 826. Merck had entered a fixed-price contract with the Defense Department to
supply pharmaceuticals. Id. Every fixed-price contract signed by the government contains an
access-to-records clause granting the government the right to examine corporate records involving
transactions related to the contract. Id. at 827-28.
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direct costs, and preventing the government from examining records for
indirect costs such as research and development, marketing, promotion, and
distribution, the Court protected the privacy of a private contractor's
business records.' A California court applied similar reasoning when
limiting governmental review of a private contractor's financial records to
records directly supporting the charges incurred by a local government. 6
Thus, third parties, including governments, "do not have an automatic right
to unfettered access to books and records ....66
Third, courts have been especially protective of a corporation's trade
secrets that are revealed by unfair business practices of competitors.' 67
Courts will not tolerate a corporation's competitor exploiting information
obtained through industrial espionage. 68 For example, the Fifth Circuit held
that taking aerial photographs of a duPont plant under construction, which
exposed a highly secretive unpatented process for producing methanol, was
a misappropriation of trade secrets.' 69 To protect the "spirit of
inventiveness," the court held that commercial privacy must be protected. 171
A Louisiana court used similar reasoning in protecting an engineering
corporation's privacy when a competitor hired a detective agency to sift
through the corporation's trash in hopes of finding confidential
7
information.' '
Finally, courts have not only protected against industrial espionage, but
have also protected information obtained in pretrial discovery of a
defamation suit. 172 For example, in Seattle Times v. Rhinehart,173 the
spiritual leader ofa small religious foundation sued two newspapers, which
he claimed printed false statements causing the foundation's membership
to drop.7 4 The trial court granted the newspapers' request for information

164. Id. at 830,836.
165. Ameri-Medical Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 384 (Ct.
App. 1996).
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Wash. Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1012 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on
other grounds by 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane); E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v.
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970); Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc. v. Steimle &
Assocs., 652 So. 2d 44, 50 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
168. Christopher,431 F.2d at 1016.
169. Id. at 1013-14. Christopher was cited approvingly by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,476 (1974).
170. Christopher,431 F.2d at 1016.
171. Steimle, 652 So. 2d at 50.
172. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20,35 (1984); Tavoulareas,724 F.2d
at 1012.
173. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
174. Id. at 22. The Aquarian Foundation is a religious organization that believes in contacting
the dead through a medium. Id. at 22. The Foundation's membership in Washington State and
Hawaii dropped from 300 to 150 members after the Seattle Times and Walla Walla Union-Bulletin
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about the foundation, but only after issuing a protective order, which
effectively prevented the newspapers from printing any information
obtained from discovery. 7 In upholding the protective order, the United
States Supreme Court dismissed the newspapers' First Amendment access

claim by stating that "a litigant has no First Amendment right of access to

information made available only for purposes oftrying his suit."' 7 6 Instead,
the Court relied on the Washington Supreme Court's observation:
[As] the trial court rightly observed, rather than expose
themselves to unwanted publicity, individuals may well forgo
the pursuit of their just claims. The judicial system will thus
have made the utilization of its remedies so onerous that the
people will be reluctant or unwilling to use it, resulting in

frustration of a right as valuable as that of speech itself.'7

In addition, the Court held that it was inappropriate to undertake any
special First Amendment scrutiny in considering a protective 1order,
as the
78
cause."'
"good
require
only
Procedure
Civil
of
Rules
Federal
In a similar case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held

that Mobil Oil Corp. had a privacy right in its confidential records obtained
by the Washington Post during discovery of a defamation suit.'79 Mobil
feared that releasing the confidential internal memoranda gathered in
discovery wouldjeopardize its relationship with Saudi Arabia, and thus the

printed articles about the group's activities. Id. at 22, 23 n.2.
175. Id. at 27.
176. Id. at 32.
177. Id. at 36 n.22 (quoting Seattle Times, Co. v. Rhinehart, 654 P.2d 673, 689 (Wash.
1982)) (quotation marks omitted).
178. Id. at 37 & n.23; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) which states:
Upon motion by a party ... and for good cause shown, the court in which the
action is pending... may make any order which justice requires to protect a
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense, including one or more of the following... (7) that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be
revealed or be revealed only in a designated way....
Id.
179. Tavoulareas v. Wash. Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1012 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other
grounds by 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).This D.C. Circuit Court panel decision was
vacated en banc in a rehearing and remanded to the trial court for further consideration in light
of the Seattle Times decision. Tavoulareas v. Wash. Post Co., 737 F.2d 1170, 1171 (D.C. Cir.
1984). The D.C. Circuit applied a more rigorous review than was required in Seattle Times. Id.
at 1172. On remand, the trial court granted Mobil's protective order request. Tavoulareas v. Wash.
Post Co., I I F.R.D. 653, 661 (D.D.C. 1986). Thus, despite the en bane decision to remand, the
D.C. Circuit's holding that a corporate right of privacy exists was never criticized.
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company would suffer severe economic harm.180 The court was concerned
for .the corporation's privacy because a business organization cannot
operate effectively if the court releases a corporation's confidential
information every time it is involved in litigation. '' Furthermore, the court
held, since the purpose of discovery is to prepare for litigation and not to
punish litigants, "a corporation's privacy interest
in nondisclosure is
' 82
essentially identical to that of an individual."'
Although courts may limit a corporation's privacy rights, courts have
protected corporations from harassment, disclosure offinancial information,
unfair business practices, and misuse of the discovery process. Thus, the
question arises whether a corporation has a sufficient right to privacy to sue
anonymously for Internet defamation when revealing its identity may cause
the corporation severe economic harm. To decide this issue, courts should
undertake the balancing test set forth in Part V.
IV. SLAPPs:

COMPLICATING THE COURT'S BALANCING ACT

To simply balance a plaintiff s privacy right with the public's right of
access to courts ignores an important development in defamation law.
Plaintiffs in most defamation claims sue, at least in part, to silence the
plaintiff's critics,183 but there is greater risk for Internet defamation
defendants. In an Internet defamation action, the defendant is generally an
individual who has published information on the Internet rather than a
traditional media outlet such as a television station or a newspaper. Since
most defendants lack sufficient economic resources to litigate against
corporations and their attorneys, there is an increased risk that legitimate
criticism84 posted on the Web will be stamped out by a corporation's threat
to sue.1

Thousands of Americans who relied on First Amendment protections
have been sued for "circulating a petition, writing a letter to the editor,
testifying at a public hearing, reporting violations of law, lobbying for
legislation, [and] peacefully demonstrating... [against corporations]."' 85
Corporations file lawsuits against citizens who have voiced their concern
regarding issues such as land development, nuclear power plants, and
landfills.'86 These types of suits, aimed at private citizens who have
attempted to influence governmental action regarding a substantive issue

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Tavoulareas,724 F.2d at 1014 n.8.
Id. at 1014.
Id. at 1022.
Lidsky, supra note 1, at 860.
Id. at 904-05.

185. PRING & CANAN, supra note 27, at I.

186. Id. at 7.
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ofpublic or social significance by partaking in activities covered by the First
Amendment, are considered SLAPP suits.'87
SLAPP suits are meant to intimidate and silence critics, not to recover
damages. 8 8 In fact, courts dismiss most SLAPP suits, but not before the
suit successfully distracts the defendant from the original underlying
issue."'89 In characterizing SLAPP suits, aNew York trial court judge wrote
a particularly strong opinion. "0 In Gordon v. Marrone,"' Judge Colabella
ordered a land developer to pay a non-profit organization $10,000 in
attorney fees.' 92 The developer had challenged the organization's property
tax exemption after the organization successfully blocked a development
project. 93 The judge described the effect of SLAPP suits:
Those who lack the financial resources and emotional stamina
to play out the "game" face the difficult choice of defaulting
despite meritorious defenses or being brought to their knees
to settle. To [sic] ripple effect of such suits in our society is
enormous. Persons who have been outspoken on issues of
public importance targeted in such suits or who have
witnessed such suits will often choose in the future to stay
silent. Short of a gun to the head, a greater threat to First
Amendment expression can scarcely be imagined.'94
Since the Pring and Canan definition ofSLAPP suits must involve a societal
issue, 9 ' it is not clear whether a corporation that sues a cyberposter for
defamation can be considered a SLAPP suit. A narrow interpretation of the
original Pring and Canan concept would seem to answer that question in
the negative.'96 However, a narrow interpretation would ignore the impact
of public corporations on the U.S. economy. For example, revenues for the
Fortune 1000 companies in the year 2000 totaled over $8.1 trillion.197 In

187. Id at 8-9.
188. Id. at 8.
189. Alexandra Dylan Lowe, The Price ofSpeaking Out, 82 A.B.A. J. 48 (Sept. 1996).
190. See Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 650 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
191. 590 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
192. Id. at 658.
193. Id. at651.
194. Id. at 656.
195. The full definition of SLAPP as used in their study is as follows: "Primarily it had to
involve communications made to influence agovernmental action or outcome, which, secondarily,
resulted in (a) a civil complaint or counterclaim (b) filed against nongovemment individuals or
organizations (NGOs) on (c) a substantive issue of some public interest or social significance."
PRING & CANAN, supra note 27, at 8-9.

196. Id.
197. Fortune 500 Companies, FORTUNE, available at http://www.fortune.com (last visited
Feb. 3, 2002). Revenues are compiled from Form 10-K filed with the Securities and Exchange
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addition, the gross domestic product of the United States in the year 2000
was approximately $9.9 trillion, of which non-farm businesses comprised
$8.3 trillion or 84%. 198 Economically, corporations have a significant
impact on society, and thus criticism of corporations inherently involves a
societal issue.'99 Therefore, a court must consider the possibility of SLAPP
suits when balancing the privacy rights of a plaintiff with the public's First
Amendment right of access.
V. How COURTS CAN RESPECT THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
PROTECT LITIGANTS FROM FURTHER ECONOMIC HARM

The courts face a difficult dilemma. On one hand, courts need to protect
the public's First Amendment right of access to courtrooms. But at the
same time, "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right
of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever-he
receives an injury."2° A potential corporate litigant may be denied that civil
liberty if it fears public rebuke for seeking a remedy.20 ' Thus, to protect
both fundamental liberties, courts must employ a balancing test that
incorporates the proper factors.
In America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 202 the
Virginia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a case where an
anonymous Indiana-based corporation sued a cyberposter for defamation.0 3
An Indiana trial court issued an order authorizing discovery of the John
Doe's identity and allowed the corporation to proceed anonymously, at
least until it uncovered the defendant's identity. 2 4 Virginia-based America
Online received a subpoena from the Anonymous Publicly Traded Co. and
moved to quash.20 5 The Virginia trial court acknowledged the public's First
Amendment right of access to courts, but gave deference to the Indiana
trial court through the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution. 2 6 Before reversal on appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court
Commission.
198. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1. 7: Gross Domestic Productby Sector (Sept. 28,

2001), availableat http://www.bea.doc.gov (last visited Feb. 3, 2002).
199. See Global Telemedia Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1265 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(holding that publicly traded companies are of public interest); ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson,
113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 639 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that publicly traded companies are of public
interest).
200. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
201. See supranote 177 and accompanying text.
202. 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
203. Id. at 379.
204. Id. at 380.
205. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26,26 (2000), rev'd,Am.
Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
206. Id. at 38; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Before allowing the plaintiff limited discovery, the
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undertook an independent review of the plaintiffs ability to proceed
anonymously. 0 7 Although the First Amendment creates a strong
presumption for open courts, the Virginia Supreme Court did not bar
litigant anonymity per se.2"' Instead, the court cited several factors similar
to the Southern Methodist factors to guide its decision. 0 9 If a litigant
showed "special circumstances," which could include "extraordinary"
economic harm, then the litigant could proceed anonymously.210 The
plaintiff in America Online, however, failed to bear the burden of proving
"special circumstances.""2 1
Cases like America Online will likely become more common as the
Internet's accessibility expands. As a result, courts are recognizing a need
to develop a standard to balance an individual's right to speak out with the
plaintiff's right to seek a remedy in Internet defamation suits.212 In Dendrite
International,Inc. v. Doe,213 a publicly traded corporation sued several
anonymous individuals for posting defamatory comments on a Yahoo!
financial bulletin board."1 4 In upholding a trial court decision denying
Dendrite's request for limited discovery for the purpose of identifying the

Virginia circuit court undertook a limited review to ensure that the plaintiff did not trample the
defendant's First Amendment right to speak anonymously. Am. Online, 52 Va. Cir. at 37. The
circuit court judge proposed a three-prong test to protect a cyberposter: A court should permit a
plaintiff to discover a John Doe's identity only
(1) when the court is satisfied by the pleadings or evidence supplied to that court
(2) that the party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, good-faith basis to
contend that it may be the victim of conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where
suit was filed and (3) the subpoenaed identity information is centrally needed to
advance that claim.
Id. The use of a good-faith standard appears to be a burden beyond a usual motion-to-dismiss
standard. Nonetheless, the extra protection given to the defendant did not prevent the circuit court
judge from denying the motion to quash the subpoena. Id.
207. Am. Online, 542 S.E.2d at 383-85. In reviewing the anonymity issue, the Virginia
Supreme Court canvassed cases decided by other courts, as the issue had never been presented to
the Virginia Supreme Court. Id. at 383-84.
208. Id. at 385.
209. Id. at 384; see also supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
210. Am. Online, 542 S.E.2d at 384-85. The court defined "special circumstances" as when
a party's need for anonymity outweighs the public's right of access to courtrooms and the
prejudice to the opposing party. Id. at 385.
211. Id. This decision, while ignoring any extra protection offered to the cyberposter by the
circuit court, protects the cyberposter's identity by forcing the plaintiff to prove the court's
"special circumstances" burden.
212. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
213. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
214. Id. at 760.
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defendant,215 the New Jersey appellate court set forth some guiding
principles.216 When ruling on a discovery motion to ascertain the names of
anonymous cyberposters, the trial court must 1) attempt to notify the
defendants that they are subject to a subpoena; 2) require the plaintiff to
identify the defamatory comments; 3) determine whether the plaintiff has
set forth a prima facie cause of action using a standard similar to probable
cause; 217 and 4) balance the privacy right of the defendants to speak
anonymously with the strength of the prima facie case and the necessity for
the disclosure of the anonymous defendant's identity to allow the plaintiff
to pursue a claim.21 Consequently, the court recognized that Internet
defamation lawsuits inherently involve competing First Amendment issues
and therefore the court must exercise extraordinary protection.
Requiring a plaintiff to meet a higher burden of proof than the usual
burden for a motion to dismiss is arguably the most unusual factor
developed by the New Jersey court. In developing the standard, the court
determined that "[p]eople who have committed no wrong should be able to
participate online without fear that someone who wishes to harass or
embarrass them can file a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of
' Consequently, by allowing
the court's order to discover their identity."219
a plaintiff to meet the lesser motion-to-dismiss burden, the court would be
implicitly disregarding the defendant's right of privacy.22 Although the
plaintiff's bar may criticize the standard as too onerous, the court quickly
silenced some potential criticism by applying the Dendrite holding to a
companion case, in which the court affirmed a trial court's decision to allow
discovery.22 '
Although the Dendriteguidelines are helpful, they do not fully address
two characteristics inherent in anonymous corporate plaintiff Internet
defamation suits against John Doe defendants. First, the Dendriteguidelines
do not directly address the potential for suits arising in bad faith, specifically
215. Although Dendrite sued several John Does, only one John Doe prevailed at the
preliminary hearing. Id. at 760 n. 1.
216. Id. at760.
217. A simple motion-to-dismiss standard would be ineffective in balancing the plaintiff's
request for disclosure with the defendant's right of anonymity. Id. at 770. A stricter standard
similar to the probable cause standard that the government must meet before a judge issues a
search warrant strikes a better balance. Id. The added burden protects "against the misuse of ex
parte procedures to invade the privacy of one who has done no wrong." Id.
218. Id. at760-61.
219. Id. at 767.
220. See id. at 770.
221. Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 773,777-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). In
Immunomedics, an anonymous cyberposter released confidential business information onto a
Yahoo! financial bulletin board. Id. at 774. The court applied the Dendritestandard, but found that
discovery could proceed because the anonymous cyberposter was an employee who had voluntarily
signed a confidentiality agreement. Id. at 777.
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SLAPP suits. Second, Dendrite offers no guidance in determining a
plaintiffs right of privacy, specifically, whether a plaintiff can sue
anonymously.
Dendrite'srequirement that a plaintiff demonstrate "probable cause"
before a court allows discovery helps preserve free discourse on the
Internet. The extra burden can prevent a plaintiff from abusing the courts
to gain information to intimidate or silence a critic.222 The crippling effect
of SLAPP suits on the First Amendment,223 however, necessitates
additional consideration, including consideration of the plaintiffs
motivation to sue. Instituting a legal presumption that when a plaintiff sues
a cyberposter the plaintiffs suit is a presumed SLAPP can effectively force
a court to consider plaintiff motivation. While this may seem unjustified at
first glance, it is important to remember that 1) most Internet defamation
suits have SLAPP characteristics,22 and 2) the presumption may be
overcome fairly easily. A plaintiffwho meets the "probable cause" element
of the Dendrite guidelines should overcome the presumption unless the
defendant has evidence to demonstrate the plaintiffs bad faith. This
presumption should not act to curtail legitimate retaliatory suits between
the parties, but it may protect a defendant from being caught in a legal
quagmire defending a meritless suit against a foe with much greater
resources.
The second factor to consider adding to the Dendrite guidelines
addresses the plaintiff s privacy. A court that permits a corporate plaintiff
to proceed anonymously in discovery should undertake an analysis similar
to the Press-EnterpriseII analysis.225 Such an analysis would require a
plaintiff to demonstrate a compelling interest for anonymity that could not
be met by any alternative less intrusive on the public's First Amendment
rights. 6 Thus, a corporate plaintiff that is particularly vulnerable to
economic harm resulting from a consumer backlash caused by suing a John
Doe should receive an opportunity to demonstrate its need to proceed
anonymously. A motion to proceed anonymously could be argued at the
same time that the trial court considers the plaintiffs discovery motion as
set forth in the Dendriteframework.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rapid acceptance of the Internet will continue to challenge
traditional notions of the law. A 2001 Jupiter Media Metrix analysis

222. See PRING &CANAN, supra note 27.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See supraPart IV.
See id.
See supranotes 69-75 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 69-75 and accompanying text.
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projects that the number of American Internet users will increase from the
current 142 million users to 211 million in 2006, which would represent a
68% penetration of U.S. households.127 The greater number of Internet
users will likely lead to more postings that are derogatory and therefore,
increased litigation. Consequently, courts must devise new ways to police
litigation. Adopting the Dendrite guidelines, with the two additional
proposed factors in Part V, is a good first step to ensure that both parties'
rights are protected.

227. Jupiter Media Metrix, Industry Projections,at http://www.jmm.com/xp/jmm/press/
industryProjections.xml (last visited Feb. 3, 2002).
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